three years, has set a clear course for the Journal. I am particularly pleased to assume the role of editor in the wake of his achievement.

Jonathan Foster

The 4th Annual Conference and 1989 AGM held at University College, London, on Tuesday, 19 September, 1989.

Main Paper

THE COURTS AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Professor I.R. Scott, Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Birmingham.

A. Introduction

At the fourth of BILA's annual conferences I spoke on the topic "The Courts and Alternative Dispute Resolution". I did so with some misgivings as I am no expert on this subject. However, as I explained on that occasion, the topic encapsulates several issues that have been troubling me for some time, both during the years I served on the Lord Chancellor's Civil Justice Review Body and afterwards. In doing a little work on them over the years I have encountered some mental blocks. I thought that if I had to gear myself up to talk to about them at the conference I might be able to clear my mind.

Those who were at the conference will remember that I did not really give a lecture. Rather, in the space of over an hour, I rambled through twelve overheads expertly flashed up on the screen by Gordon Cornish. Some of the overheads contained, or at least hinted at, a great deal of information. After the event, I realised that I would not be able to reduce to readable form the territory I covered in my own, inexpert way. The overheads and the notes I used lie in a badly disorganised file at the back of a drawer. I rather hoped that the successive requests I received for an account of my lecture would disappear if I ignored them for long enough. However, that was not to be and eventually my conscience got the better of me. I realised I had to produce something that could be read at leisure.

What follows is not the transcript of a lecture and it is not a law article in the traditional

sense. Rather it is a collection of notes strung out into narrative form. I have endeavoured to touch upon most of the points I made at the conference. In some instances I have found it very difficult to reduce to narrative form points made on some of the more exotic overheads.

B. The ADR Movement

Shortly after the Second World War, some American legal writers became interested in what they called "private ordering". They were concerned with the ways in which individuals through their own efforts adjusted their relationships, for example, prospectively through contractual agreements and retrospectively through adjudicatory and other dispute resolving mechanisms. However, alternative dispute resolution, or "ADR" as it is known in the judicial administration trade, did not attract much interest until the 1980's. The literature on the subject has grown enormously. Contributions have come not solely or even primarily from practising and academic lawyers. Practitioners of other social sciences have been involved. Discussion had ranged from the highly theoretical to the intensely practical and across virtually every known boundary in the administration of justice and indeed beyond. Although the literature is enormous, much of it is unoriginal; the same points are made over and over again. Thus, the babble of voices is loud; it is also confusing and for one coming to the subject for the first time it is difficult to find a way in. Nothing I have to say about ADR is original; I have drawn upon several sources in the literature that strike me as being among the more substantial.

The use of the word "alternative" causes us to ask "alternatives to what?" What is meant, certainly in North America and this country, are alternatives to what could be called "the traditional court process". The movement towards developing alternatives to traditional adjudication attracts three, possibly four, different groups. There are:

(i) those who seek alternatives to law itself or, at least, to particular parts of the substantive law (often landlord and tenant law and family law);

(ii) those who are disturbed by contemporary professionalism in law and who seek to "de-lawyerise" dispute resolution (e.g. members of consumer movements and, increasingly, business men).

The members of these two groups are of a radical mind and want to see traditional dispute resolving processes abandoned and new and different, not merely alternative, ones put in their place.

Then there are:

(iii) those who want to see fairly modest reforms which will provide acceptable alternative judicial procedures for the less serious cases thereby helping to "save" the courts (and their traditional procedures) for the cases that courts should really be concerned with (whatever they might be).

The possible fourth group in the alliance consists of:

(iv) those (usually found in government) who want to see economies made in public expenditure on the administration of justice and who believe that ADR mechanisms might prove cheaper to run than traditional courts.

The members of the last two groups are likely to see "alternative" processes as being complementary rather than as replacing traditional methods.

These four groups, or "constituencies" as they are sometimes called, form an unlikely but powerful political (with a small "p") alliance. You can see that the political alliance that has been built around ADR contains some pretty strange bedfellows.

The search for alternatives has ranged far and wide, well away from the kinds of issues dealt with by courts and the processes used by courts. It had led to an examination of the resolution of disputes by irrational as well as by rational methods, for example by physical force and by the tossing of a coin. It had led to an examination of the ways in which decisions are made in the political process, for example, by voting and by legislation, and in the economic sphere, for example by the private market and by management in organisations. Indeed, the mixing up of decision-making processes with dispute resolving processes is one of the main causes for confusion in the literature.

C. The Response to Weaknesses of Traditional Court Processes

Despite their differences, the members of the groups I have mentioned as being proponents of ADR agree that there is something wrong with "traditional court processes". This had lead to much greater thought being given to the precise nature of these traditional processes both in the common law (adversarial) and continental (inquisitorial) court systems. The alternatives proposed are usually based on some analysis of traditional processes and usually they give emphasis to particular aspects of these processes.

Inevitably, much of the substantive law of any legal system consists of principles and rules defining what, in law, constitute valid claims to compensation or redress of some other kind. Claims between individuals could be left unsettled but a legal sytem that failed to provide a method for the settlement of disputes would appear to be lacking in one of its primary duties; that is, to provide a means for the realisation of what the substantive law proclaims. If importance is attached to settling disputes, as it must be, it is necessary to establish methods for so doing. Preferably, the methods chosen must be ones about which there can be very little dispute. Happily, it is often possible to have almost complete agreement about a method for settling disputes when it is impossible to reach any sort of agreement about the rights and wrongs of a particular dispute itself (see Lucas, "On Processes for Resolving Disputes" in *Essays in Legal Philosophy* (Summers ed. 1968) p. 180). Looking at this from the point of view of a lawyer one would hope that the mode of dispute resolution chosen should be the one that maximises the likelihood that specific resolution of disputed claims will accord with applicable law and relevant facts (Summers, "Law, Adjudicative Processes, and Civil Justice" in *Law Reason and Justice* (Hughes ed. 1969) p. 174).

A trial at law is a second-level process for achieving the settlement of a dispute that, for one reason or another, could not be settled at the first-level (see Golding, "On the Adversary System and Justice" in *Philosophical Law* (Bronaugh ed. 1978) p. 98). At the second-level a new factor in the form of a third-party is introduced. Conceivably, the third-party may play one of a number of different roles but the significant feature of a trial at law is that the third-party in the form of a court acts as an adjudicator. But, the process of adjudication also may take different forms. Trial at law is a special kind of third-party adjudication and many writers have attemped to isolate and describe its salient features. Insofar as there is agreement as to what these features are it seems to be generally accepted that it does not matter whether a particular forum acts inquisitorially or adversarily; the essential characteristics of a trial at law do not require that one mode of proceeding be preferred to the other.

Efforts have been made to describe the differences between inquisitorial and adversarial systems and the advantages and disadvantages of each have been staunchly championed and, on the other hand, rigorously criticised. Trial at law in the Anglo-American legal systems based on the common law is said to be adversarial. However, in common law systems, including England, there has been a move away from adversary procedures in certain areas (e.g. juvenile court and mental commitment proceedings) towards non-adversary and expert-administered processes (see Schur, Law and Society (1968) p. 198).

I have always been rather irritated by this debate as I always suspected that it was

much more complicated than was made out. I have been much relieved since I read Damaska, *The Faces of Justice and State Authority* (1986) which is a magnificent work and which reveals the stupidity of those who, on the basis of a brief visit to France and a cursory examination of their court system claim to be smitten by the so-called inquisitorial system and argue that we in this country ought to adopt aspects of it.

Many ADR writers, in analysing traditional common law court processes refer to characteristics enumerated by Professor Chayes in 1976 (Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976)). He was concerned with the role of American courts in pubic law cases. He noted that many cases now being adjudicated are an amalgam of private and public interests; typically, such hybrid cases involve the application of government regulation to particular circumstances, or the attempt by one private party to constrain the activities of another based upon constitutional considerations or statutory policies.

Chayes said (ibid p. 1282) "traditional adjudications" consist of the following five characteristics: (i) the lawsuit is bipolar; litigation is organized as a contest between two individuals or at least two unitary interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all basis;

(ii) litigation is retrospective; the controversy is about an identified set of completed events: whether they occurred, and if so,with what consequences for the legal relations of the parties;

(iii) right and remedy are interdependent; the scope of the relief is derived more or less logically from the substantive violation under the general theory that the plaintiff will get compensation measured by the harm caused by the defendant's breach of duty - in contract by giving the plaintiff the money he would have had absent the breach; in tort by paying the value of the damage caused;

(iv) the lawsuit is a self-contained episode; the impact of the judgment is confined to the parties; if the plaintiff prevails there is a simple compensatory transfer, usually of the money, but occasionally the return of a thing or the performance of a definite act; if the defendant prevails, a loss lies where it has fallen; in either event, entry of judgment ends the court's involvement; and

(v) the process is party-initiated and party-controlled; the case is organized and the issues defined by exchanges between the parties. Responsibility for fact development is theirs; the trial judge is a neutral arbiter of their interactions who decides the

questions of law only if they are put in issue by appropriate move of a party.

What is wrong with adjudication, specifically with court adjudication? The identification of the failings of adjudication follow on from the characteristics identified by Professor Chayes and developed by other authors. This is familiar territory and we need not spend a lot of time on it but we should notice that reform proposals are always based on perceived weaknesses of adjudication and different reformers stress different weaknesses. Further, some of them are highly selective and perhaps wrong in some of the criticisms they make of adjudication.

The criticisms that have been made can be classified variously (see e.g. Paths to Justice: Major Public Policy Issues of Dispute Resolution, U.S. Department of Justice Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dispute Resolution and Public Policy (National Institute for Dispute Resolution, January, 1984)). There are those that focus on (i) cost, (ii) delay, (iii) access, (iv) participation, and on (v) inappropriateness of forum (e.g. inadequate expertise, ineffective remedies). A particular and much-voiced criticism has been the divisive nature of traditional processes. It is argued that the processes are inappropriate where the parties concerned are in a continuing relationship.

So much for the failings of adjudication. What has been the response? We know that a lot has gone on. Developments can be listed under various headings (see e.g. Marks, Szanton & Johnson, *Taking Stock of Dispute Resolution: An Overview of the Field,* commissioned by the National Institute for Dispute Resolution (1981)).

There are those concerned with (i) reforming the courts (e.g. procedural reform, case management, diversion, settlement conferences, (ii) creating now forums (e.g. arbitration, ombudsmen, mediations), and with (iii) system change (e.g. no fault).

D. Dispute and Process Characteristics

A simple list of activities in the dispute resolution field does not tell us much. It does not tell us much about the processes being used or the disputes with which they deal. A closer analysis is required. There are at least two ways of proceeding.

First, one could look closely at the various types of civil dispute that seem to exist and seek to tease out what seem to be their important characteristics or variables. This is likely to be a difficult endeavour because we will find it hard to know where to stop. Secondly, one could adopt a rather more practical approach and look for significant characteristics or variables among the processes that are currently used to resolve disputes, including traditional court processes.

Let me try to give you the flavour of both approaches without going into too much detail, taking them in the order in which I have mentioned them.

1. Dispute Characteristics

A number of authors have adopted this approach; I will confine my remarks to to the writings of two of them.

Professor Emond starts by pointing out that disputes are not static but evolve as time goes by. He says that disputes may be "characterized" under four headings (Emond, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual Overview" 22 Kobe University Law Review (International Edition) 1 (1988) pp. 10-15). These headings are:

(i) the causes of the conflict, for example, whether arising through (a) supply and demand, (b) different perceptions of a situation (cognitive conflict), or (c) differences in values;

(ii) variations in the dimensions of conflict, for example, (a) complexity (multiplicity of issues and parties), (b) whether distributive or integrative (i.e. whether parties' interests are necessarily in opposition, the problem is integrative if a way out in which both can "win" something may be found, e.g. by "expanding the pie"), (c) significance of what is at stake (longevity of result, impact on others), and (d) what is in dispute (e.g. policy or facts);

(iii) the parties in dispute, that is, (a) the number of parties and their relationships, (b) whether corporate or not, and (c) whether capable of rationality;

(iv) timing, that is to say, whether the process is reactive or anticipatory (either seeking to avoid disputes or to structure and manage them in ways that minimize conflict.)

The second author I wish to draw to your attention is Professor Barton. His approach to dispute characteristics identifies eight variables (see (a) and (h) below) under three headings (see (i) to (iii) below) and he claims that they indicate the most important structural features possessed by problems calling for judicial "solving" (Barton, "Justiciability: A Theory of Judicial Problem Solving" 24 Boston College Law Review 505 (1983) p. 517). This approach may be sketched as follows:

(i) the "difficulty" of the problem, that is to say,

(a) whether the problem is composed of 'simple' variables (i.e. no variable influences any other variable) or 'interactive' variables (i.e. where trade-offs exist among the variables that comprise the problem and a proper solution is an optimization that considers all the intricate connections),

(b) whether the decisional criteria for its solution are well-established or, rather, are unknown or disputed, and

(c) whether decisional information or evidence is based on past, or future events;

(ii) the "setting" of the problem, that is to say,

(d) whether the relationship of the parties is "simplex" or "multiplex",

(e) whether the dispute is "private" or "public", and

(f) whether private resolution of the problem is feasible or infeasible;

(iii) the "social concerns" associated with the problem, that is to say,

(g) whether social consensus or "dissensus" exists regarding the proper outcome of the problem, and

(h) whether private resolution of the problem is socially desirable or undesirable.

2. Process Characteristics

Now turning to the more practical approach of attempting to identify process, rather than dispute characteristics or variables, what do we find?

Well, the identification and description characteristics, or variables, of extant processes is now fairly well settled. The leading exponents of this are the American Professors Goldberg, Green and Sander. Under their influence several process characteristics have been identified. They are: (i) voluntary/involuntary, (ii) binding/ non-binding, (iii) third party role, (iv) degree of formality, (v) nature of procceding, (vi) outcome and (vii) private/public (see Goldberg, Green & Sander, *Dispute Resolution (1985)* p.9). The volume of the literature on process characteristics is enormous and repetitive.

E. The Dispute Resolution Continuum

Whether you begin with an analysis of disputes or an analysis of processes identifiable in the real dispute resolution world, sooner or later you are going to be driven to some classification of dispute resolution processes that is better than the list we looked at some time ago. Here, the process characteristics approach just mentioned is the key.

Often, the role of the third party seems to be the critical variable. As Goldberg, Green and Sander have illustrated, you can divide dispute resolution processes into those that involve a third party and those that do not and those that do can be further divided according to the role that the third party plays. This leads us to the so-called dispute resolution continuum.

The terminology is not settled but sometimes it is said that there is a continuum and it starts with (i) negotiation and ends with (v) adjudication with (ii) mediation, (iii) conciliation and (iv) arbitration (in its various forms) in between (there are difficulties in defining and classifying arbitration, also sometimes mediation and negotiation are collapsed). Some authors add other processes to the continuum, either as quite separate mechanisms or as "hybrids" combining aspects of the basic five processes. To take account of this we could add, after (i) to (v), a sixth category on the continuum labelled as "hybrids". Goldberg and his colleagues list as "hybrids" (i) private judging, (ii) neutral expert fact-finding, (iii) mini-trial, (iv) ombudsman, and (v) summary jury trial. As I have already said, in analyses of this type, the third party variable seems to be the predominant one.

Negotiation, mediation and conciliation are informal, non-coercive forms of dispute resolution. On the other hand, adjudication is a formal, coercive method (arbitration is best regarded as a form of adjudication). Where disputes may be adjudicated if all else fails, the other steps on the continuum are affected by that prospect. In these circumstances, negotiation, conciliation and mediation take place "in the shadow of the law" and in the knowledge that coercive adjudication may be invoked eventually by one party.

If we look beyond the "role of the third-party" variable to the other variables, we can produce a matrix by matching up the catagories of process found on the dispute resolution continuum with the process characteristics (or variables) outlined above (see Goldberg, Green & Sander, *Dispute Resolution (1985)* p. 9). Here, my effort to reduce to narrative form some of the overheads I produced at the conference breaks down. The reader should imagine that the labels of the rows accord with the six process characteristics and the columns with the six categories of process.

This matrix enables us to say something about the various strengths and weaknesses on each of the dispute resolution mechanisms appearing on the dispute resolution continuum. Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the various dispute resolution mechanisms we can start to think about the ways in which particular disputes might ideally be matched up with particular processes.

F. Relationship Between DR Mechanisms: "Litigotiation"

Up to this point I have been assuming that the various dispute resolution mechanisms are as a practical matter quite separate and that the problem is to match the right dispute with the right process. Of course, you know and I know that the real world is not like that. For example, if we take the ordinary civil court case we will probably find that the parties will have engaged in negotiation, conciliation, or mediation processes in an attempt to resolve their problems. Further, after court process has been issued they may continue to engage in such efforts.

It is obvious that the various forms of dispute resolution are not mutually exclusive; the concession that "hybrids" exist illustrates this. The most obvious connection for those of us who are lawyers is that between negotiation and adjudication.

As an American author Jonathan Marks has put it:

> On the contemporary American legal scene, the negotiation of disputes is not an alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is litigation. There are not two distinct processes, negotiation and litigation; there is a single process of disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals that we might call litigotiation, that is, the strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court process. Full-blown adjudication of the dispute — running the whole course [to trial] — might be thought of as an infrequently pursued alternative to the ordinary course of litigation.

However, "litigotiation" is not always successful in resolving disputes and, further, even in the many cases where it is, it seems to be an unsatisfactory process.

Why should this be so? Marks, Green and Croom in *Beyond Adjudication (1988)* talk of the barriers that seem to exist to parties arriving at a settlement negotiated by them and their attornies in "litigotiation". They say these barriers include (see p.5):

(i) *emotional barriers*, as where there is antagonism or lack of trust between the parties and/or counsel, or where parties and/or counsel are unable to evaluate or

communicate rationally;

(ii) *communication barriers*, as where one or both parties are unwilling to negotiate because of the risk of being perceived as weak, or where one or both parties are unwilling to be honest about settlement positions because of strategic considerations stemming from lack of knowledge of the other side's position;

(iii) *predictive barriers* arising from different views of the law, the facts, and the likely adjudicatory outcome;

(iv) *representation barriers*, as where the lawyer fails adequately to prepare the case or is inattentive to the case, or where economic incentives do not favour early resolution, and

(v) *external and situational barriers;* for example, the parties may view the risk of uncertainty of a third party decision differently, as where a repeat institutional litigant faces few consequences from an adverse verdict but the individual litigant faces ruin; or the dispute may be linked to other disputes, as where the litigate/settle decision of a party is not limited to a single case.

Supplementary processes (by which these authors mean particularly arbitration and mediation) annexed to the court process are designed to overcome these barriers.

G.Criticisms of ADR

The ADR movement has had a fair wind. Virtue seems to be on their side. But some voices of criticism have been raised. Even members of the movement have wondered out loud why the movement has not had more success. There have been plenty of examples of ADR processes being introduced to deal with minor, small cases and one wonders whether they are going to be restricted to such cases.

Does ADR have a more important role to play? Are there dangers in giving ADR processes a wider role? If alternative procedures are to be designed for cases other than the most minor our experience in operating the existing, traditional processes should throw up a range of particular questions.

Professor Carrington, one of America's leading civil procedure scholars, had argued that answers need to be provided to the following questions (Carrington, "Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution" 34 Journal of Legal Education 298 (1984)):

(i) What qualifications are to be expected of a "dispute resolver" in the ADR system? (How is neutrality and impartiality to be guaranteed? How are they to be selected and how removed? are they to be professional or lay or is there to be a balance of both?)

(ii) If different "resolvers" are to be used in different kinds of disputes, how are disputes to be channelled to the right dispute resolver? (What is to be done about jurisdictional problems whether based on territory or subject-matter?)

(iii) If the ADR mechanism is intended to achieve decisions that conform to controlling law, how are dispute resolvers to be made accountable for their fidelity to that law without excessive "legalism" creeping in? If they can "forget about the law" and base their decision on "equity, good conscience etc." how is reasonableness ensured?

(iv) Is the ADR mechanism expected to adhere to any particular procedural norms? What are the consequences of procedural error? Would abolition of interlocutory appeals lead to ADR procedures becoming ineffective?

(v) On what information are the decisions of the ADR mechanisms to be based? What are the consquences of "relaxing" the rules of evidence? Are decisions to be based on mere assertions or on informal statements by parties? Is it proposed that the ADR mechanism shall have the effect of extracting information from disputants even through it might be against their interests? Above all, how does the ADR mechanism propose to get available information at reasonable cost? Who should pay?

(vi) Might there be a need to control or deter misuse of the ADR process? What is to be done about protecting the system from hopeless claims, dilatory defences and perjury? Is there to be tort liability for abuse of process? How are advocates or "representors" appearing to be disciplined? Are cost sanctions to be used?

(vii) What are the prospects for the ADR mechanisms dealing fairly with impecunious disputants? Should there be a charge for the ADR service? Who is to pay for interpreters, expert evidence etc.? Are we happy about moving the costs of litigation away from the parties on to the State? Are we confident that the State will pick up the bill, not only now but in years to come?

(viii) Will the ADR mechanism effectively terminate disputes? What if a decision turns out to be mistaken, obtained by fraud, or contrary to law? What are to be the res judicata effects of an ADR decision, and what are to be the effects on non-parties? and, finally,

(ix) Will the ADR mechanism have the power to compel obedience to its dictates? How will enforcement work? And to what extent can enforcement be varied or controlled by contract?

ADR enthusiasts are likely to dismiss these matters as being so much humbug and as flak put up by lawyers in an effort to prevent change. I do not think that they can be so easily dismissed. Indeed, I think the difficulty in answering them indicates the difficulties that have been encountered in extending ADR mechanisms beyond the smaller disputes.

H. Prospects in England

If there is to be a break-through in England it seems to me that it will come in the form of new arrangements for pre-adjudication disposal of the more serious civil cases, that is to say, in the field of "litigotiation". There is a whole range of litigotiation techniques, some of them formerly regarded as separate dispute resolution techniques or as various "settlement programs" (e.g. informal adjudication, early neutral evaluation (ENE), "mini-trials" and pre-recorded video-tape trials (PRVTT)).

The further development of these techniques holds out the prospects of: (i) the saving of costs to litigants and the saving of court resources, (ii) the freeing up of lawyers' time enabling them to handle more cases, (iii) the increase of the incidence of "mediate" rather than "dichotomous" outcomes (enabling both sides to "win" something), and (iv) the reduction of post-trial reviews and appeals.

English lawyers are beginning to dabble with these techniques. It will be interesting to see whether they receive encouragement from the major repeat players on the civil litigation scene, for example, from the insurance companies. Doubtless it will be said that lawyers have always emphasised the importance of negotiated settlements and that there is nothing new in litigotiation but the name. However, I think that what is new is a shift of emphasis towards negotiation in the post-process phase and away from the "preparing for trial" emphasis. This shift has brought about a new awareness of what lawyers have been doing all along and an interest in developing more sophisticated negotiating and settlement techniques.

I suspect that, in the past, the divided legal profession has retarded developments; one could not expect that barristers would be much interested in dispute resolution techniques for the more serious cases where those techniques deflected cases away from the courts. But now, things are beginning to change and it may be that the breaking down of the divisions within the profession will help. In my view, lawyers,

whether solicitors or barristers, should be selling themselves as the problem-solvers for parties locked in contentious cases and not simply as the hand-maiden of inexorable judicial processes. They should move themselves to the centre of dispute resolution processes and not be content to remain at the margins. Perhaps we are looking for a new kind of lawyer (and here I make what I think might be an original contribution to the ADR jargon), the "advogiator".

Well, that brings me to the end of my attempt at a narrative account of my lecture at the BILA Annual Conference held in September 1989. I hope it is a reasonably coherent account. Needless to say, if any BILA member would like clarification or further and better particulars I would do my best to help (write to me at the Faculty of Law, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT).

MINUTES OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING held at University College, London, WC1 at 12:00 noon on Tuesday, September 19, 1989

APOLOGIES

Apologies were received from Messrs. Lincoln, Lock and Pincott.

MINUTES OF THE LAST ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The minutes of the Annual General Meeting held on Tuesday, September 20, 1988, and printed in Journal No. 69 were agreed and signed by the Chairman.

MATTERS ARISING

None.

ELECTION OF AUDITORS

The meeting unanimously agreed that the auditors, Charles Rippin & Turner should be re-elected for the coming year.

REPORTS

The Hon. Secretary's report for the year ending September 1989 was presented and agreed.